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INTRODUCTION
Over a decade ago, the author founded Venture Law
Forum in Tokyo, Japan—a community for lawyers, venture
capitalists, and other practitioners purposed to gather data and
observe trends in Japan’s emergent venture capital industry.
Early in 2010, the forum’s findings were released in a book titled
Law and Finance of Venture Companies in Japan. Based on years of
observation and analysis of the Japanese venture industry, the
author is qualified to speak on the subject of why the venture
capital industry in Japan has developed differently than its
Silicon Valley counterpart.
The most pronounced difference between these two
situations lies in the incentive bargains between entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists. It has been conclusively shown that US
entrepreneurs abandon control of their companies while
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Japanese entrepreneurs do not. Years ago, Bernard Black and
Ronald Gilson tried to explain the difference by pointing to the
lack of liquid initial public offering (“IPO”) markets.1 Even
though there are now multiple liquid IPO markets in Japan,2
Japanese entrepreneurs are still reluctant to abandon control of
their companies to investing venture capitalists. While there
must be many complementary reasons, such as different market
situations, different social norms, etc., the difference can be
partly explained by the different legal systems affecting the
respective venture capital industries.3
A typical incentive bargain involves human capital
providers—entrepreneurs—and monetary capital providers
—venture capitalists (“VCs”)—that agree to invest in the
creation of a venture company. If one party bears too much risk,
she will hesitate to invest her capital. In order to maximize each
party’s respective payoff, both parties are compelled to bargain
with each other in a fashion that motivates the other to invest
her respective monetary or human capital. Without a bargain
that is acceptable to both sides, the venture is likely to fail.
Moreover, when creating this bargain a typical two-sided agency
problem must be overcome.4 Control sharing and value sharing
are at the middle of each incentive bargain in that both parties
seek a bargain which allows for sufficient control sharing to
lower potential risk, and value sharing sufficient to incentivize
each to provide their capital.5 These two aspects of the bargain
are also complementary each other.
In Silicon Valley, this two-sided agency problem is resolved
by having entrepreneurs abandon control to venture capitalists
and complementarily giving entrepreneurs additional cash-flow

1. Bernard Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998).
2. See infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
3. Curtis Milhaupt pointed out the existence of legal obstacles in Japan many
years ago. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan:
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865,
887 (1997).
4. See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Appendix for a more comprehensive description of the incentive
bargain. See also Zenichi Shishido, The Incentive Bargain of the Firm and Enterprise Law: A
Nexus of Contracts, Markets, and Laws, in ENTERPRISE LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND
LAWS IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN (Zenichi Shishido ed., forthcoming).
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rights through “sweat equity.”6 In Japan, venture capitalists are
prevented from gaining control and entrepreneurs are not able
to take advantage of sweat equity. Because of the two-sided
agency problem both parties downsize new venture financing
and are satisfied with smaller success. In fact, Japanese VCs
invest less than JPY¥100 million (US$1 million) in a company on
average or less than one-tenth of the US average.7
There have, however, been remarkable changes in the
Japanese venture capital industry in the 2000s. Several IPO
markets for emerging growth companies were created.
Deregulation revolutionized the shape of corporate law. The
legal infrastructure needed to facilitate incentive bargains
common in the American landscape looks to be in place. Many
nonprofit organizations (“NPOs”) interested in helping
entrepreneurs were established around 2000 and have been
contributing to the creation of venture communities in Japan.
An infrastructure similar to that of Silicon Valley is fast
developing and working to promote venture capital investments.
Yet, Japanese entrepreneurs still do not abandon control to
venture capitalists.
Regarding the enigma of the Silicon Valley entrepreneurs’
unquestioned abandonment of control to venture capitalists,
Black and Gilson explain that entrepreneurs, who have
abandoned control, may be able to regain control if they
successfully reach an IPO.8 Thomas Hellmann’s explanation is
that typically, it is economically beneficial for entrepreneurs to
keep more equity stake by giving control to VCs.9 Why these
arguments do not explain the current Japanese situation is still
an enigma.
Silicon Valley VCs usually obtain control by using the four
complementary methods: viz., obtaining stock majority;

6. See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text; Zenichi Shishido, The Law and
Practice of the Venture Industry in Japan: A Period of Transition, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM: AN ERA OF TRANSITION 193, 194 (Tom Ginsburg & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
2012).
7. See infra note 79.
8. Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 243.
9. See Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts,
29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998).
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obtaining board majority; staged financing; and entering into
agreements.10
Japanese entrepreneurs do not abandon stock majority for
two reasons. First, they typically do not require or believe they
do not require an amount of capital that would necessitate the
issuance of an amount capital stock that would cause them to
end up with a minority share. Second, the cost of losing stock
majority is higher than in Silicon Valley because: Japanese
corporate law is based on the shareholder choice doctrine;
reputational markets are not mature enough for entrepreneurs
to trust venture capitalists; and entrepreneurs cannot earn sweat
equity in trade for abandoning stock majority. 11 There is a
strong belief that there is little benefit to Japanese
entrepreneurs that give up the right to control their companies
to VCs.
On the other hand, there are two main reasons why
Japanese VCs are not as eager as their Silicon Valley
counterparts to obtain board majority within venture capital
start-ups. First, gaining board control is much less beneficial to
Japanese VCs than to Silicon Valley VCs because of legal
impediments under Japanese corporate law. The “Shareholder
Choice Doctrine” gives shareholders of Japanese corporations
much more control, a role played by the board under US
corporate law. Second, the costs of sending directors to a
start-up are higher in Japan than in the United States. This is
due to the corporate law differences between the two countries;
the Japanese corporate law statute dictating a high level of
director liability to creditors makes it a much riskier prospect to
be a board member in Japan.12
Japanese VCs gain less informal control through staged
financing than their counterparts in Silicon Valley because they
do not always plan to continue investing in the start-up over
different rounds. This can also be explained by that fact that

10. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281
(2003).
11. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.
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syndicate financing13 is not a standard in the Japanese market.
A general review of the situation brings to light several corporate
governance problems for Japanese VC funds as the reasons for
such practices.14
Although not much formal control is desired by Japanese
VCs, some informal control is acquired by entering into stock
buy-back agreements with the entrepreneurs. This mimics the
corporate lending practices engaged in by the so-called “main
banks” that dominate the Japanese market. Such a unique
contractual arrangement makes it difficult for venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs to trust each other.15 Essentially this gives
entrepreneurs a reason to believe that the VC is not fully
invested in their company, while simultaneously giving the VC
little incentive to help manage the venture.
Several of Japan’s institutional infrastructures, such as the
capital markets, reputational markets, and the legal system,
complementarily affect the incentive bargain between
entrepreneurs and VCs. Those institutional infrastructures in
Japan have, for the most part, now caught up with their US
counterparts. Yet, they fail to provide conditions sufficient to
entice entrepreneurs to either abandon control or push VCs to
desire control over the board. These key differences are why the
venture capital start-up world is still very different in Japan.
In Part I, this Article focuses on the 2000s, during which
rapid changes to the institutional infrastructures occurred that
affect venture capital investments in Japan. Part II points out
that even in Silicon Valley, entrepreneurs abandoning control to
VCs is not a matter of course, and further reviews the different
explanations given by Black and Gilson, and Hellmann. In Part
III, the reason why control is so important from the point of the
two-sided agency problem is expounded upon. Part IV reviews
why Japanese VCs cannot gain enough control to resolve the
two-sided agency problem, considering the four common
methods used by VCs to gain control. Part V will conclude with a
few words on the issues faced by those in the Japanese venture
start-up community.
13. In syndicate financing, a lead venture capitalist (“VC”) heads the group of
VCs participating in the same round, under the same contract.
14. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
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I. CHANGES IN THE JAPANESE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Although there have been numerous, substantial changes
in the Japanese venture capital industry over the last decade, the
changes have not been able to mimic the environment found in
Silicon Valley. The biggest difference that remains between the
two countries is the adherence to a system where Japanese
entrepreneurs’ maintain control even after VCs have input their
maximum capital investment.16
Focusing on the venture capital industry, there have been
three major changes in Japan. First, multiple IPO markets for
emerging growth companies were created; second, substantial
amendments to the corporate law were made; and, third,
venture communities have been gradually developing.
A. IPO Markets
After the deregulation of the financial and capital markets
in 1996 (the “Japanese Big Bang”), several IPO markets were
launched. 17 The Tokyo Stock Exchange created the
“MOTHERS” market in November 1999 and subsequently, the
NASDAQ-Japan market opened its doors in May 2000.
NASDAQ-Japan was then absorbed by the Osaka Stock
Exchange and renamed “Hercules” in December 2002, after
NASDAQ decided to leave the Japanese market. The former
over-the-counter stock market was reorganized into the JASDAQ
Securities Exchange in December 2004. Most recently, the
JASDAQ market and Hercules market merged into a singular
JASDAQ market in 2010. Japan Exchange Group was established
16. Actually, not only in the venture capital industry but also in corporate
governance of large publicly held corporations, 1997 was a turnaround year in Japan.
See Zenichi Shishido, The Turnaround of 1997: Changes in Japanese Corporate Law and
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 310 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1997). Since then, the legal
system and Japanese corporate governance practices have changed significantly. This is
also true when considering publicly held corporations; an important characteristic of
Japanese corporate governance is management’s adherence to control. For more on
Japanese venture capital and corporate governance before 1997, see Milhaupt, supra
note 3.
17. See Sadakazu Osaki, Innovation and the Regulation of the Capital Markets in
Japan (Oct. 30–Nov. 1, 2008) (unpublished working paper) (on file with Colmubia
University School of Law).
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as a result of the business combination between the Tokyo and
Osaka stock exchanges in January 2013. In July of the same year,
the Japan Exchange Group moved the JASDAQ market to the
Tokyo Stock Exchange as part of the above integration of stock
exchanges.
Now, there are several IPO markets for emerging growth
companies in Japan, which are competing against each other for
new public listings.18 Unfortunately, several immature venture
companies went public, tainting the reputation of Japan’s
fledgling IPO markets.19 This may have also played a role in
slowing the growth of the newly emerging venture capital
industry.
B. Corporate Law Amendments
Japanese corporate law has been deregulated rapidly in the
2000s as well. Although these corporate law reforms covered a
very wide subject area, 20 the following four points are
particularly significant for venture capital investments.
1. Stock Options
Stock options were first introduced to Japan in 1997. Before
this introduction, Japanese start-up companies were not able to
use stock options as a method for giving human capital
providers equity incentives. A famous venture capitalist in
Silicon Valley, who once had attempted to enter the Japanese
market and eventually abandoned the idea after a thorough
investigation of the investment environment in Japan, pointed
18 . Mothers: Criteria for Listing (Mothers), TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, http://
www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/listcriteria/index_mo.html (last visited May 16, 2014);
JASDAQ: Criteria for Listing (JASDAQ), TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.tse.or.jp/
english/rules/listcriteria/index_jq.html (last visited May 16, 2014); Centrex: NAGOYA
STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.nse.or.jp/system/centrex/ (last visited May 16, 2014);
Ambitious: SAPPORO SECURITIES EXCHANGE, http://www.sse.or.jp/sinki/ambi.html
(last visited May 16, 2014); Q-Board: FUKUOKA STOCK EXCHANGE, http://
www.fse.or.jp/index.html (last visited May 16, 2014); TOKYO PRO Market: TOKYO
STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/promarket/ (last visited May
16, 2014).
19. See Osaki, supra note 17, at 9; Ministry of Econ., Trade, & Indus. [METI],
Study Group for the Creation and Development of Start-ups Final Report 73 (Apr. 30,
2008), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/Startups_Finalreport.pdf.
20. See Shishido, supra note 16, at 313.
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out deficiencies in the corporate law—particularly the lack of
stock options. 21 Although stock options were originally
restricted to very limited use, they were totally deregulated in
2001.22 Now, stock options are widely used for many purposes,
including a way to give equity incentives to human capital
providers of start-up companies.
2. Preferred Stock
Japanese corporate law had been quite loyal to the
one-share-one-vote rule and the equal treatment of all
shareholders. Consequently, issuing different types of stock
other than common stock, particularly, no-voting stock and
multiple-voting stock, had been strongly restricted.23
Although such a legislative policy might be reasonable for
keeping good corporate governance of publicly held
corporations,24 it turned to be an obstacle to venture capital
investments in Japan. In Silicon Valley, incentive bargains
between entrepreneurs and VCs are made separately on sharing
of cash-flow rights and sharing of control, based on freedom of
the parties to agree to almost any form of preferred stock.25
In 2000 and 2001, Japanese corporate law was deregulated
so that using preferred stock became more flexible, like US
preferred stock. Now entrepreneurs and VCs can use nearly the
same type of convertible preferred stock as is used in Silicon
Valley, including veto rights and class voting. Although the
number of cases involving venture financing through issuance of
preferred stock has increased, particularly in cash-demanding
industries such as telecommunication, biotechnology, and
semiconducting, preferred stock has not yet been widely used
within the Japanese VC investment world (see TABLE 1).26
21. Interview with Steve Domenik, Partner, Sevin Rosen Funds, Tokyo, Japan
(Nov. 7, 2000).
22. See Shishido, supra note 16, at 315.
23. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 198 (2000).
24. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
25. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 281.
26. See HIROKAZU HASEGAWA, BENCHA KYAPITARISUTO NO JITSUMU [THE PRACTICE
OF VENTURE CAPITALISTS] 64 (2007); Tatsuhiro Takahara, Torishimariyaku no
Sennin-kengen no Bunpai to Torishimariyaku no Sekinin [Sharing Board Seats and Liability of
Directors], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF
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TABLE 1: VC’s Use of Preferred and Common Stock
April 2007 – March
2008 (million
dollars)

April 2008 – March
2009 (million
dollars)

Investment in
Preferred Stock

17.862

12.705

Investment in
Common Stock

125.279

92.141

All Investment

142.961

101.846

It should also be pointed out that the limited use of
preferred stock may be the reason for many “living-dead
companies” in Japan, which are not bankrupt but have no hope
of reaching an IPO. Usually, the VCs have no liquidation
preference and thus no incentive to dissolve such companies,
instead letting them stagnate.27
3. Limiting Director Liability
The 2001 corporate law reform allowed companies to put
an upper limit on damages for negligent directors. 28 The
amendment was a reaction to the prior reforms in the previous
decade. The corporate law reform of 1993 had fixed the filing
fee for shareholder derivative actions, resulting in an apparent
VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN] 414 (Zenichi Shishido & Venture Law Forum eds.,
2010). The Data in Table 1 is from HASEGAWA, supra, at 81.
27. See Allen Miner & Kosuke Sato, Bencha Kigyo Ikusei no tame no Seitaikei [Venture
Habitat], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE
COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 130.
28. Kaisha-ho [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, arts. 425, 426, 427 (Japan)
[hereinafter Companies Act], translated at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/
English%20translation%20of%20Companies%20Act.pdf.
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increase in the number of such lawsuits.29 Prior to the 2001
reform, some court decisions had ordered a number of
negligent company directors to pay extensive amounts in
damages.30 The business sector lobbied seriously for some cap
on the amount of director liability for damages incurred by
negligent conduct.31
The cap on damages cannot be agreed to ex ante for
non-outside (executive) directors, but can be allowed ex post
either by a two-thirds vote of a shareholder meeting or by
agreement of the board of directors if so provided in the
charter.32 A significant portion of the 2001 amendment was the
new ability to cap potential liability for outside directors. 33
Outside directors can make an agreement with their company,
ex ante, on the appropriate cap on the amount of damages,
potentially up to two years of their compensation from the
company.34 This change should have made it less risky, and,
thus, more likely for VCs to send board members to their
portfolio companies. As discussed in more detail later, however,
it is still not standard for Japanese VCs to send directors; instead,
at most they choose to send observers.35

29. See Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 672 (2001); see also Mark
West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (2001).
30. See, e.g., In re Daiwa Bank, 1721 HANREI JIHO 3 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Sept. 20,
1999); Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate
Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 11 (2003). Without finding any conflicts of interest, a large amount of damages
were ordered to individual directors for their negligence in monitoring. This case
shocked the business world, just as the Caremark case, In re Caremark International
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), had in the United States.
31. See Shishido, supra note 16, at 319.
32. See Companies Act, supra note 28, arts. 425, 426.
33 . Japanese corporate law requires outside directors to have never been
employees or executive directors of the company, but does not require other
independency. See Companies Act art. 2(xv). Therefore, it should be noted that the
meaning of “outside director” is not the same as “independent director” in the United
States. The requirements for outside directors are, however, planned to be revised to
be closer to US requirements in 2014.
34. See Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 427.
35. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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4. Freedom of Contract (Articles of Incorporation)
Besides the specific parts of the corporate law changes
mentioned above, deregulation of corporate law as a whole was
and will continue to be very significant for the practice of
venture capital investments. Japanese corporate law used to be
considered mandatory law (over-riding contractual agreements
in contravention of such law), even in regards to corporate
governance matters. Over the last decade, the ideology behind
the term ‘freedom of contract,’ or the free planning of most
governance issues through specification in the articles of
incorporation, has gained considerable ground in legal basis. In
the corporate law reformation of 2005, the principle of freedom
of contract was formally acknowledged and established.36 Now,
at least in closely held corporations, which include start-up
companies,
Japanese
shareholders
can
plan
their
inter-relationships as freely as their counterparts in the United
States.37
C. Venture Communities
A bilingual lawyer, with experience practicing both in
Silicon Valley and in Tokyo, observes: “[I]n 1997, the venture
community in Japan had not yet achieved any critical mass.
There were a handful of entrepreneurs and start-up companies,
and perhaps even fewer venture capitalists, but an infrastructure
to assist these companies did not yet exist.”38 It does seem that

36. See Zenichi Shishido, Teikan-Jichi no Hani no Kakudai to Meikakuka: Kabunushi
no Sentaku [Expansion and Clarification of Area of Free Planning by Charters: Shareholders’
Choice], 1775 SHOJI HOMU [COM. L. REV.] 17 (2006). Kenjiro Egashira, chairman of the
legislative commission (Hoseishingikai) at the time of the 2005 corporate law
reformation, recalls that one of the major subjects of the reformation was to stimulate
the venture industry. See Kenjiro Egashira, Kaisha-ho Seitei no Rinen to Kaishahosei
Minaoshi no Yukue [The Philosophy of Legislating the Companies Act and the Direction of
Ongoing Revision of Corporate Law] 1414 JURIST 95 (2011).
37. Introduction of the limited liability company (“LLC”) in Japan in 2005
represented the liberalization of the freedom of contract under the legal framework.
The Japanese LLC allows for almost perfect freedom of contract. See Shishido, supra
note 36, at 23.
38. John Sasaki, Shirikonbare niokeru Yusenkabushiki Keiyaku no Hensen [Historical
Changes in Preferred Stock Contracts in Silicon Valley], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU
SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 296.
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venture communities have seen gradual development over the
last ten years in Japan.39
Several non-profit organizations have played an important
role in organizing venture communities. In 2000, Nippon
Angels Forum40 was first organized. In 2001, Business Veterans
Group 41 and Venture Law Forum 42 followed suit by starting
their own venture partnerships. Then, in 2002, Japan Venture
Capital Association43 was launched. Those NPOs have set up an
infrastructure to provide entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and
other professionals with opportunities to exchange information
and expand their professional networks.
Professionals, such as venture capitalists, lawyers, and
accountants that are specialized for start-up companies, have
been gradually increasing and provide an infrastructure to assist
these companies. There has also been growth in expatriate
entrepreneurship with VC funding in Japan.44
In addition to venture capital firms, there is growing
participation in early-stage investments by angel investors—
wealthy individuals who provide seed capital to new ventures. In
his 1997 article, Professor Milhaupt pointed out that there were
no angel investors in Japan.45 By 2008, however, there were
more than ten angel networks in Japan,46 comprised of roughly
360 investors.47 It is likely that the number has continued to
39. For more on the venture community in Silicon Valley, see ANNALEE SAXENIAN,
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128
(1994).
40. See NIPPON ANGELS FORUM, Nippon Angels Forum (Pamphlet) (Apr. 1, 2004)
(in Japanese) (on file with author).
41. See BUS. VETERANS GROUP, http://www.veteran.jp (last visited May 16, 2014).
42. Venture Law Forum (“VLF”) is a non-profit organization, which the Author
has organized with practicing lawyers, accountants, venture capitalists, capital markets
specialists, journalists, and academics. The main purpose of the forum is to gather
information on Japan’s venture industry.
43. See JAPAN VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, http://www.jvca.jp (last visited May 16,
2014).
44. See, for example, J-Seed Ventures Inc., a small venture-themed company in
Tokyo that supports both Japanese and non-Japanese entrepreneurs in establishing
start-up companies with venture capital derived from both domestic and international
sources. For more information on the type of start-up companies in this sub-community
of the Japanese venture capital industry visit www.j-seed.com.
45. See Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 877.
46. See METI, supra note 19, at 53.
47. See ROBERT KNELLER, BRIDGING ISLANDS 169, 183 (2009).
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increase over the last three years. While the angel community
remains comparatively small, with investment amounts that are
far lower than those invested in the United States, it has been
vital to the financing of certain biotechnology start-up
companies.48
There is no doubt that the current situation of Japan’s
venture industry in 2014 is totally different from the situation in
1997. Yet, the development of a true venture community is still
distant and the industry has not matured enough to provide a
good reputational market to help decrease the risk to
entrepreneurs and improve the role of the VCs in Japan.49
II. WHY DO ENTREPRENEURS ABANDON CONTROL TO
VENTURE CAPITALISTS IN SILICON VALLEY?
Even in the United States, entrepreneurs occasionally
attempt to keep control from falling into participating VCs’
hands. Fifteen years ago, there were serious debates on why
entrepreneurs often abandoned their control, particularly in the
Silicon Valley model. It is clear that US VCs usually obtain some
rights of control. This is costly to the founder/entrepreneur
because the VC may have the legal authority to displace the
founder from the CEO position at any time.50 Why does the
founder transfer control rights to VCs when it makes her so
vulnerable? A number of possible explanations have surfaced.
A. Black & Gilson
Black and Gilson pointed out that the use of convertible
preferred stock and the existence of liquid IPO markets create
the “call option of control” for entrepreneurs.
Their explanation is that an implicit component of a
venture capital financing contract is an option on control given
to the founder. This right to reacquire control is realized upon
(i) a conversion of the venture capitalist’s preferred stock to
common stock, which forces the venture capitalist to give up all
48. See id. at 169, 182.
49. See infra notes 115–126 and accompanying text.
50. The founder has the risk of his managerial quasi-rents being expropriated. See
Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Financing, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 256
(1994); see also Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 258.
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contractual control rights, (ii) an exit by the venture capitalist
through liquidating her stake in a public offering, or (iii) a
dilution of the venture capitalist’s stake below a point where she
exercises any meaningful control. 51 Given that both parties
usually share the common goal of participating in a lucrative
public offering, founders are typically given a powerful and
heavily leveraged financial incentive to bring about this result.
This incentive may be strong enough to outweigh the potential
risk of losing the position at the helm of the venture company
the entrepreneur/CEO founded.
B. Hellmann
Hellmann simply explains that entrepreneurs abandon
their control to VCs because entrepreneurs can keep more
equity than otherwise by doing so.
This explanation presumes that the founder can retain a
significantly larger portion of equity when the choice to give up
control is made. The venture capitalist permits the retention of
a larger equity stake because it produces a two-fold benefit. First,
the venture capitalist has an incentive to invest in finding
superior management teams (to replace the founder if needed).
Second, founders with a highly leveraged financial interest in
the success of the venture company have sufficient financial
incentive to give up control, even where they lose the private
benefits associated with control.52
C. Why Not in Japan?
Both the explanation given by Black and Gilson and that of
Hellmann sound persuasive. Because of the above-described
changes to Japanese corporate law and the maturing of the
venture community, both explanations could also be true in
Japan now, but the reality is that Japanese entrepreneurs still
choose not to abandon control to VCs.
When Black and Gilson published their Article fifteen years
ago, there were no liquid IPO markets and the Silicon Valley
51. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 260. As Black & Gilson explain, “the
prospect of an IPO exit gives the entrepreneur something of a call option on control,
contingent on the firm’s success.” Id. at 261.
52. See Hellmann, supra note 9, at 57.
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type of convertible preferred stock was not yet available. Now,
Japanese entrepreneurs and VCs are able to take advantage of
several liquid IPO markets 53 and engage in freely-planned
convertible preferred stock agreements. 54 Thus, Black and
Gilson’s argument that the call option for entrepreneurs could
not work in Japan because of the lack of a liquid IPO market
and convertible preferred stock is not sufficient to explain the
current Japanese situation.
Hellmann’s explanation should also apply to Japan under
the current legal system, and even as it existed fifteen years ago.
By gaining control, Japanese VCs could also decrease their risk
and thus allow entrepreneurs to keep more equity than would
be the case otherwise. Accordingly, it should be beneficial to
entrepreneurs as well.
It is clear that both explanations fail to account for the
situation that exists in Japan.
III. WHY IS CONTROL IMPORTANT?
Before discussing the differences between Japanese venture
capital investments and Silicon Valley practices, it is necessary to
understand the importance of the role that control plays in
venture capital investments throughout most countries.
A. The Two-sided Agency Problem and Control Sharing
Control is vital to any venture capital deal because of the
existence of a typical two-sided agency problem.55 If VCs feel too
much risk, they will hesitate to invest their monetary capital. On
the other side, if entrepreneurs feel too much risk, they will
hesitate to invest their human capital. For maximizing their own
payoff, both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs need to
reduce not only their own risk, but also that of their
counterparts, by bargaining for agreements specifying specific
control- and value-sharing commitments.56

53. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
55. See generally, Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral
Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts, 26 RAND J. ECON. 761 (1995).
56. See infra Appendix.
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1. What Types of Risk Do VCs Feel?
One thing that many VCs fear off the bat is that
entrepreneurs may lack management capability. Even though an
entrepreneur may be an excellent engineer, in most cases, he
has little business experience and is unable to manage the firm
after it grows beyond a certain size.57 In that case, VCs would
usually try to replace the founder CEO with a professional
manager more accustomed to handling a larger-sized
company.58 If VCs have no control then the entrepreneur will
be able to retain the CEO position, causing a situation in which
the firm’s value may stagnate, or even decrease. If the CEO is
uncooperative, it may lead to a disaster for all parties involved.
Another issue for VCs is how to inhibit entrepreneurs from
pursuing private benefits, such as a high salary or luxury perks.59
For example, if VCs have no control, they cannot stop the
entrepreneur from leasing an unaffordable office space or
otherwise wasting capital meant for the betterment of the
venture on obtaining the trappings of personal wealth and
power.
Thirdly, and related to the second issue, is that
entrepreneurs may seek continuation of the venture even if the
correct business decision is to shut down.60 Likewise, a venture
business may turn into a “plaything” for some entrepreneurs. If
VCs have no control, they can do little to nothing to remedy
issues such as this, presenting a source of unnecessary costs via
risk.
Fourth, entrepreneurs may exit at unfavorable timing for
VCs. For some start-up companies, their only valuable asset may
be the talent of the entrepreneur and her management team.
Without them, the firm is valueless. The entrepreneur may
decide to leave the firm after VCs have already invested money
but before the investments have produced any return. Actually,
VCs cannot avoid this type of risk even through gaining control.

57. See Jesse Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 NYU L. REV. 967, 989 (2006).
58. See Hellmann, supra note 9, at 58.
59. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 989.
60. See id.
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Instead, they try to avoid this risk by use of contractual schemes,
such as vesting requirements61 and “drag along” rights.62
One other important issue often faced by VCs is where an
entrepreneur rejects an IPO proposition or mergers and
acquisitions (“M&A”) deal that would benefit the VC. It is
understandable that entrepreneurs are often against selling off
their firms, in many cases to competitors. This is either due to
the entrepreneurs’ sentimental attachment, or because of
deemed liquidation clauses that prove unfavorable to
entrepreneurs.63 Notwithstanding this hesitancy, an M&A deal is
an important exit strategy for VCs if an IPO is not achievable. It
is also not surprising that when entrepreneurs are against an
IPO, it is because they may dislike the cost of disclosure or the
risk of possible hostile takeovers after the IPO takes place.64
Despite these potential conflicts, the IPO remains the dominant
exit strategy for Japanese VCs both in number and in
profitability. IPOs accounted for 44.9% of VC exits, while M&A
deals or resale of control to entrepreneurs were the next most
popular methods—with roughly equivalent showings of 16.3%
and 13.2%, respectively.65
VCs have the ability to reduce or eliminate most of these
risks by gaining control. Only the fourth issue, related to early
withdrawal by the entrepreneur, cannot be resolved through VC
control.

61. See MICHAEL HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING
NEGOTIATION 6-18, 13-1 (3d ed. 2000).
62. See id., at 6-18.
63. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. As a typical case of conflict of
interests derived from deemed liquidation clauses, see in re Trados Incorporated
Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 1512-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013).
64. As a recent phenomenon, disclosure regulations in the United States and
Japan nicknamed SOX and J-SOX have substantially increased the cost of reaching
Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) and being listed. See Zenichi Shishido & Sadakazu
Osaki, Reverse Engineering SOX versus J-SOX: A Lesson in Legislative Policy, in ENTERPRISE
LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN, supra note 5.
65. Venture Enter. Ctr., Survey on Current Status of Investment of Venture Capitals and
Other Funds (Jan. 2010), http://www.vec.or.jp/wordpress/wp-content/files/survey
-21j-5.pdf; see also METI, supra note 19, at 90. However, because of the troubled
economic market, IPOs accounted for just 9.9% in fiscal year 2008. See Venture Enter.
Ctr., supra.
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2. What Types of Risk Do Entrepreneurs Feel?
It is now important to ask what are the real and perceived
risks that an entrepreneur experiences vis-à-vis VCs?
First, VCs may behave opportunistically because they are
often concerned with only monetary value of a portfolio
company. For example, VCs may attempt to squeeze out
entrepreneurs or other existing shareholders; VCs may value the
company unfavorably for entrepreneurs and other existing
shareholders when subsequent rounds of capital are raised; and
VCs may also act to benefit their class at the expense of other
shareholders as a group, especially when they own preferred
stock with special rights.66
Second, VCs may exit at unfavorable timing for
entrepreneurs. Particularly, venture capitalists tend to choose
immediate liquidation events if it appears to present the greatest
potential for profit or loss mitigation.67
Entrepreneurs can reduce these risks if they are able to
maintain control post venture financing.
B. Sharing Cash-Flow Rights and Sweat Equity
Bargaining for cash-flow rights can be complementary to
the control sharing agreements.68 Typical schemes in Silicon
Valley involve sweat equity—the profit earned by the
entrepreneurs and founding employees when a common stock
matures.
Usually, the first transaction between the entrepreneur and
the VC is a second stage financing. The first stage is typically a
smaller infusion of seed capital, perhaps a “friends & family” or
“angel” round. When the VC enters the scene, it invests in a
company with some business history, and the company issues
new stock to the venture capitalist—typically preferred stock that
is convertible into common stock. 69 The preferred stock is
issued, for example, at a price of US$2.00 per share to the
66. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. As a typical example of opportunistic
behavior by VCs, see Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Technologies, Inc., 2013 WL 1104901
(Del. Ch., Mar. 15, 2013).
67. See id. at 994.
68. See infra Appendix.
69. HALLORAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 6-11.
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venture capitalist, while the price of the common stock issued to
the founder was US$0.10 six months earlier. 70 Suppose the
preferred stock provides for (1) non-cumulative dividends, (2) a
liquidation preference equal to the original issue price,
(3) mandatory redemption, (4) voting rights equivalent to those
of the common stock, (5) convertibility into one share of
common stock, (6) anti-dilution protection, and (7) automatic
conversion into common stock upon a public offering.71 These
terms are fairly typical of a second-round investment. They also
reflect fascinating and complex incentives. To reiterate how
useful it is to examine contractual organizations with respect to
the contracting parties, these terms illustrate that the venture
capitalist has pre-chosen its remedy for bad outcomes—a
liquidation preference—as well as set up its control and
participation rights for good outcomes.
A feature that underlies the incentive bargain is that, in
allocating equity the parties exchange the financial capital
contribution of the venture capitalist for the human-capital
contributions of the founder. Because preferred stock is
automatically converted into common stock upon a public
offering, the common stock and the preferred stock have
comparable value if the venture is a success. In other words, the
preferred stock’s seniority disappears if the venture is successful,
as measured by the ability to consummate a public offering.
One of the reasons why VCs in Silicon Valley invest through
preferred stock is for tax reasons.72 The argument is that the
common stock acquired by the entrepreneurs, and the
preferred stock acquired by the VCs, are wholly different stock,
so their price difference is reasonable. The value of the common
stock builds over time with the efforts expended by the
entrepreneur input to reach a profitable exit.
As a result, entrepreneurs and managers of start-up
companies can avoid current taxation and enjoy tax deferral and
reduced tax rates under capital gains rules. It has been an
established IRS practice not to challenge most sweat equity

70. Id. at 6-12.
71. Id. at 6-11.
72. See Ronald Gilson & David Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 889 (2003).
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schemes, 73 although the climate looks to be changing and
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regulations under Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 409A, which became effective as
of January 1, 2009, point toward a less lenient taxation trend.74
IV. WAYS THAT VENTURE CAPITALISTS GAIN CONTROL
In Silicon Valley, the two sided agency problem is resolved
by making entrepreneurs abandon control to VCs.75
Methods by which control is captured by VCs can be
divided into formal ways of gaining control and indirect ways of
gaining control. Formal methods require either obtaining stock
majority or obtaining board majority. The indirect methods
incorporate either through staged financing or specific
agreement (monitoring contracts).76
A. Control via Stock Acquisition
First and foremost, VCs obtain control by gaining a stock
majority in the venture capital industry at large. This, however, is
not the case in Japan. Although the equity ratio of VCs has
gradually increased, the average ratio at IPO in 2008 was still
17.50%. 77 As mentioned previously, Japanese entrepreneurs
keep stock majority even after IPO in many cases (see TABLE 2).78
73. The US Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) loosely follows what is casually
known as the 10-to-1 rule. It is not a written rule but a tax practice, to which venture
communities in the United States are accustomed. See id. at 892, 900; JOSEPH W.
BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS AND
REORGANIZATIONS 82–83 (2d ed. 1995).
74. Under the final regulation IRC 409A, the standard for fair market value will be
stricter, often requiring a third party valuation. However, many practitioners predict
that the “10-to-1” rule might still be effective—at least for an early stage start-up
company as long as the board determines “in good faith” that the preferred stock is
worth ten times the value of the common stock. See Zenichi Shishido, Sweat Equity as a
Gift (Sho Sato Conference at UC Berkeley Law School) (unpublished working paper,
2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/8364.htm.
75. In Silicon Valley, the reputational market plays an important role for filling
the risk gap faced by entrepreneurs who abandon control to venture capitalists.
76. See infra Appendix.
77. Hirokazu Hasegawa, Bencha Kigyo no Genjo [The Current Situation of Venture
Companies], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF
VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 49, 54.
78. Takahiro Takahara, 51% Mondai [51% Problem], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU
ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26,
at 420, 421; Shishido, supra note 6, at 197. Data by PRONEXUS.

1108 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1087

TABLE 2: Founder Family Shareholding at IPO (average)
JASDAQ/NEO

Mothers

Hercules, and
others

2009

72.1%

58.8%

N/A

2008

66.4%

50.4%

59.0%

2007

63.3%

53.7%

55.2%

2006

66.5%

59.0%

54.8%

2005

57.3%

58.0%

60.6%

1. Reasons Behind an Entrepreneur’s Ability to Maintain Stock
Majority in Japan
In Silicon Valley, entrepreneurs are usually forced to
abandon control of their venture capital financers because they
require an amount of money that can only be provided by
risk-taking VCs. Japanese entrepreneurs keep stock majority
because they seek to raise relatively small amounts of money
from VCs. In fact, Japanese VCs invest less than JPY¥100 million
in a venture start-up company on average, which is less than
one-tenth of the US average.79
There are three hypotheses that are used to explain why
Japanese entrepreneurs raise smaller amounts of money from
VCs.
One hypothesis is that Japanese entrepreneurs do not
perceive a need to raise a large amount of capital. Most Japanese
start-up companies are either in the software industry or in the
service industry, which are not considered cash demanding

79. See METI, supra note 19, at 61.

2014] DOES LAW MATTER TO FINANCIAL CAPITALISM? 1109
industries.80 This is supported by the fact that even Japanese
entrepreneurs are forced to abandon control in the
biotech/pharmaceutical industry, which requires huge amounts
of financing to reach a favorable result (see TABLE 3).81

80. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 60.
81. See KNELLER, supra note 47, at 170. Japanese entrepreneurs rely on both
government funding and private venture capital to finance technology ventures.
Government funding accounts for about 20% of average R&D expenses, but comprises
a significantly higher proportion among firms that receive government grants. The
liberalization of listing requirements for Japanese equity markets in the late 1990s
enabled entrepreneurs to decrease their reliance on government funding and raise
pre-IPO equity capital from Japanese VCs. See id. Data in TABLE 3 from Japan Venture
Research Monthly Report, January 2009, at 6.
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TABLE 3: VC Investment and IPO Pricing by Sector (all amounts
are millions of Yen)
Company
Type

VC
investment

IPO
financing

Telecom

Total
financing
(median)
419

89

287

Total market
valuation at
IPO
3,544

Services

280

72

227

3,143

Pharma.

2,989

2,690

623

5,282

All
companies

401

72

248

3,165

Company
Type

PER
at IPO

Number of
VCs
investing

VC
equity
ratio (%)

Years
before
IPO

Telecom

Total
pre-IPO
market
valuation
1,799

25.17

3

14.28

7

Services

2,277

14.33

1

5.32

23

Pharma.

6,372

- 2.31

21

55.79

11

All
companies

2,796

12

2

11

17

Some VCs point out that Japanese entrepreneurs generally
have small dreams in comparison to their US counterparts.
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While US entrepreneurs try to dominate world markets as soon
as possible, Japanese entrepreneurs tend to aim only for the
domestic market.82 Many would attribute this difference to the
different atmospheres of risk and its acceptability in the United
States compared to Japan.
The second hypothesis is that individual Japanese venture
capitalists are risk averse to a point, stifling their ability to match
American VC investment standards. Most of them are “salary
men” of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and
manufacturing companies without much experience or appetite
for truly risky ventures. Additionally, they lack an equity
incentive to invest in most cases. It is economically reasonable
for them to not invest a large amount of money in a single
company; instead, they prefer making a wide range of portfolio
investments, as would any investor attempting to mitigate
potential loss through diversification.83
The third and final hypothesis is that debt financing can be
complementary for Japanese start-up companies, including
government loans. In the Japanese capital market, debt
financing plays a major role, especially for venture financing in
its early history.84 Still today, the share of debt financing in
start-up companies in Japan is much higher than it is in the
United States.85
2. Reasons for Entrepreneurs’ Adherence to Stock Majority in
Japan
Why do Japanese entrepreneurs insist on retaining stock
majority?
First, there is a cultural aspect which helps explain the
situation. Japanese entrepreneurs may not be genuinely
equity-oriented and they place importance on other issues,
which are considered “more than money.” The most important
82. See Presentation by Allen Miner (CEO, SunBridge) at Venture Law Forum,
supra note 42, on September 25, 2007.
83. See infra notes 115–123 and accompanying text; see also Miner & Sato, supra
note 27, at 98, 103.
84. See, e.g., YUICHIRO ITAKURA, SHACHO SHIKKAKU [A FAILED CEO] (1998); see
also Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 878.
85. It may be influential that governmental agencies provide start-up loans and
start-up guarantees in Japan. See HIROKAZU HASEGAWA, BENCHA MANEJIMENTO
NYUMON [INTRODUCTION TO VENTURE MANAGEMENT] 159 (2010).
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thing for them is to keep control of their company.86 Such
behavior looks very much like that of family company owners
and what is commonly termed “founder’s syndrome.” A
proposition of Hellmann’s logic is that VCs and entrepreneurs
share the same goal—to maximize their own return on
investment. This proposition looks to hold much less sway within
Japan.
Second, there is another obstacle applying Hellmann’s
logic to the Japanese situation. One of Hellmann’s propositions
is that entrepreneurs have the ability to retain a larger equity
share as a complement of giving up control. But, Japanese tax
law is unfriendly to the method of using equity as an incentive.
Particularly, the Japanese National Tax Agency challenges the
sweat equity practice as a virtual gift and thus, recipients are
required to pay gift tax at a prohibitively high rate.87 As a result,
the sharing of cash-flow rights has not become a complementary
way to bargain for control sharing.
Third, influences still remain from the extensively
bank-centered capital market present in Japan. 88 This is a
path-dependent factor because the venture capital industry does
not exist independently and is inevitably influenced by the
86. It turns out that one reason Japanese entrepreneurs have historically resisted
selling their companies is because of unfavorable tax treatment (vis-à-vis IPOs), as a
result there is only a limited mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) market in Japan. See
Michael Korver, Egujitto toshite no M&A [M&A as an Exit], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU
ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26,
at 465, 466, 473. In other words, the exit strategy for venture capitalists is often limited
to IPOs. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 111.
87. There are several possible reasons for such unfriendly tax treatment of sweat
equity by the Japanese tax agency. See Shishido, supra note 74; Zenichi Shishido, Zeisei
ga Kigyo-Katsudo no Pureiya no Doukizuke ni Ataeru Eikyo [Influences of Tax on Incentives of
Players in Firms], in KIGYO TOCHI NO TAYOKA TO TENBO [DIVERSIFICATION OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS FUTURE] 185, 189 (Hideki Kanda ed., 2007);
Tatsuaki Kitachi, Masahiko Kitazume & Yoshichika Matsushita, Zeimu jou no Ronten [Tax
Issues], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE
COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 366, 375. After serious negotiations between the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”) and the National Tax Agency, in
October 2011, a footnote was included on the website of METI that states, in effect,
that the exercise of a qualified stock option for common stock could be based on the
value of the company’s common stock and need not be based on the price of preferred
stock issued before the stock option. It is a small but significant step toward the
establishment of the practice of issuing sweat equity in Japan. See Shishido, supra note 6,
at 201.
88. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 243; see also Milhaupt, supra note 3, at 897.
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capital market situation as a whole. In Japan, stock ownership of
publicly held corporations has been stabilized through
bank-centered cross shareholding. Black and Gilson presume
the existence of a Berle and Means world, where management
maintains control through dispersed stock ownership,89 but that
proposition is lacking in the Japanese stock market for
companies after IPO.
Fourth, the reputational market for VCs has yet to evolve in
Japan. VCs are not trusted by entrepreneurs and although this
obstacle has seen improvement over the last ten years, venture
communities are still not mature. There is no mechanism in
Japan for filling the risk gaps created for entrepreneurs who
must make deals with VCs that lack a readily available
reputation.90
The competing legal systems also play an important role in
creating the different attitudes toward stock majority observed
by entrepreneurs in both countries. Japanese corporate law is
based on the shareholder choice doctrine, while American
corporate law is based on the management choice doctrine.91 In
Japan, shareholder meetings are used as a tool to decide almost
all issues faced by the company. This includes charter
amendments, regardless of whether the board of directors
cooperates. 92 In addition to this, there was no class voting
system in Japan until 2001. Even after preferred stock was
deregulated and class voting became available, class voting has
remained rare, even within companies that have issued
preferred stock.93 That means, in most venture companies in
89. See Black & Gilson, supra note 1, at 243.
90. For more on the significance of the reputational market, see infra Appendix.
91. See infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text; see also Shishido, supra note 6,
at 199.
92 . Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 295; see also KENJIRO EGASHIRA,
KABUSHIKI-KAISHA HO [LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS] 296–97 (4th ed. 2011). Under
Delaware law, only the election of directors and amendment of the bylaws do not
require board approval before shareholder meetings decide. See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE,
THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 54 (2008).
93. The infrequent use of class voting is probably due to the strict legal rule which
abolishes class voting arrangements altogether if shareholders cannot elect the
required number of directors through a class vote. See Companies Act, supra note 28,
art. 112; see also Hajime Tanahashi, Shurui-kabushiki no Tsukaikata [Ways of Using Different
Types of Stocks], in BENCHA KIGYO NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF
VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN], supra note 26, at 290.
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Japan, directors can only be elected by the shareholders as a
whole. Clearly, stock majority plays a very important role,
enough to have Japanese entrepreneurs insist on maintaining
stock majority.
B. Control via Board
The second way VCs can obtain control is by gaining a
board majority.94 Again, this is not the case in Japan. Japanese
VCs almost never gain or even attempt to gain board control. In
many instances they agree to have no board seat at all,
preferring instead to send observers to the board.95 Observation
rights allow the VCs to keep an eye on the workings of the board
while maintaining a liability buffer. They can also be used to
help VCs make determinations on whether or not to make use
of a “stock buy-back” clause imbedded in the venture
agreement.96
Simply put, Japanese VCs make conscious decisions not to
control a company’s board because the perceived benefit does
not outweigh the perceived liability of directorship in Japan.
The modern Japanese legal system is ambiguous in regards to
negligent directors. Some courts have found liability to
third-parties (i.e. creditors) for negligence of supervision at a
bar far lower than that seen in the United States.97
1. Smaller Benefit
As pointed out, board control is less important in Japan
than in the United States. Shareholder meetings are used in
Japan, where, board meetings are typically more influential in
the United States.98 Furthermore, VCs choose to avoid investing
through preferred stock in most cases.99 Accordingly, the VCs

94. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 290.
95. See Presentation by Tatsuhiro Takahara (Partner, TMI Law Firm) at Venture
Law Forum, supra note 42, on April 7, 2008; see also Takahara, supra note 26, at 405,
406.
96. See infra note 124–125 and accompanying text.
97. In re Maruzen Inc., 27-5 MINSHU 655 (Sup. Ct., May 22, 1973).
98. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 53; Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at
976.
99. See Hasegawa, supra note 26, at 64.
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are less worried about bad behavior by common shareholders
because of the lower risk of conflicts of interest arising.100
Interestingly, when looking at the role of the board,
Japanese law is less regulatory than US law. This is merely a
result of the fact that Japanese law is based on the shareholder
choice doctrine, whereas US law is based on the management
choice doctrine.101
In the United States, several business decisions must be
made by the board and even amendment to bylaws cannot grant
the shareholders such decision making powers. The board
manages the business and affairs of the company, initiates
charter amendments, and fundamental transactions, such as
mergers, IPOs and liquidations. Shareholders, on the other
hand, usually cannot initiate fundamental transactions, even
when their approval is required to effectuate the transaction.102
In Japan, shareholder meetings are the tool used to make
decisions in areas including dividends and executive
compensation—issues outside of the control of shareholders in
the United States. Shareholders can even initiate charter
amendments.103 Not only Japanese but also US corporate law
allows the shareholders to decide almost everything, as long as
the charter so provides. It is, however, difficult to imagine a
venture company which has such provisions in its charter
because venture companies generally see themselves as future
public companies. The default rules are hard to deviate from
and are usually influential to the incentive of the parties.
This analysis shows a clear difference in the levels of
importance granted to the board in the two countries.
2. Higher Costs
The risk to Japanese VCs does not require board control,
but is incurred if even a single board member is sent.
100. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 977.
101 . See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 53; MITSUHIRO FUKAO, FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL
COMPANIES 4 (1995); Shishido, supra note 23, at 198.
102. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000(a) (West
1990); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01 (1984); see Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at
976; Shishido, supra note 6, at 199.
103. Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 295, 466.

1116 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1087
There is no significant difference in director liability to the
company between the two countries under the current legal
system. Companies can set a cap on liability for outside directors
through provisions in the articles of incorporation.104 Director
and Officer (“D&O”) insurance will cover most costs incurred if
liability is found, unless there is gross negligence. The
shareholder derivative action systems are not exactly the same
but are more similar than not.
There is one important difference when considering
venture capital directors in particular. The problem is that in
venture capital backed firms, there are many conflicting interest
situations among shareholders. Most conspicuous of the
conflicts are those existing between the entrepreneur and
venture capitalists. Issues arise when both sides meet to discuss
and eventually determine important factors including company
valuation, decision to sell the venture, liquidations, mergers, and
so on. The question becomes whether venture capital directors
can use their voice to cast a vote that favors the venture capital
interest without violating the fiduciary duties attendant to their
directorship positions within one of their fund’s portfolio firms.
Japanese written law plainly states that directors have
fiduciary duties to the company and requires directors elected
by class-voting to be loyal to the company, not to their electing
body.105 Some Japanese lawyers may be concerned about the
possible fiduciary duty violation by their venture capitalist
clients, who inevitably have conflicting interests, and courts may
recognize their gross negligence, although there has been no
such legal case so far.106
In answer to this problem, Delaware courts once adopted a
“control-contingent” approach to fiduciary duties. 107 This
104. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
105. Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 355.
106. See Takahara, supra note 78, at 408; Shishido, supra note 6, at 200.
107. Fried & Ganor summarized the case law as follows: “[A] common-controlled
board is free to serve the interests of common shareholders at the expense of the
preferred shareholders and aggregate shareholder value. In contrast, a
preferred-controlled board can make business decisions that serve the preferred at the
expense of common, as long as those decisions can be defended as in the best interests
of the corporation.” Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993. See generally Equity-Linked
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997); Orban v. Field, No. 12820,
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Apr. 1, 1997).
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precedent provides the parties with an additional economic
incentive to give venture capitalists board control.108 Other than
for tax reasons, using preferred stock allows venture capitalists
that invest in Delaware corporations, the ability to mostly avoid
fiduciary duty litigations even when venture capital directors
clearly pursue venture capitalist interests. However, it appears
that recent Delaware cases changed this precedent and the
situation is now unclear.109
The bigger difference between US and Japanese law exists
when considering the potential for liability to third parties, i.e.
creditors.
Japanese written law dictates that directors are liable for
damages to a third-party that are caused as a result of their gross
negligence in the course of executing their duty to the
company.110 Actually, there are many cases in which directors
have been ordered to pay damages of creditors—particularly in
bankruptcy cases—for reasons including insufficient oversight.111
There is no such law or precedent in the United States, and only
in the case of fraud to creditors, will a director face the
possibility of being held personally liable. 112 Because of this
corporate law statute and its case law, it continues to be a risky
venture to take on a directorship at a start-up company, which
generally has a higher risk of bankruptcy and thus potential
liability claims by third party creditors.
C. Control via Staged Financing
Many commentators have pointed out that the most
significant scheme by which VCs gain substantial control in
108. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 57, at 993.
109. In re Trados Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 1512-VCL, slip
op. at 35–36, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013) (denying the control-contingent
approach in a footnote).
110. Companies Act, supra note 28, art. 429; see Shishido, supra note 6, at 200.
111. See EGASHIRA supra note 92, at 469–76.
112. See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
LAW 236 (3d ed. 2011) (debating over whether directors owe a duty to creditors in the
case of insolvency or near insolvency); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corporation, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991) (deciding there is no
claim by creditors in the zone of insolvency and no direct claim (but a possible
derivative claim) by creditors in insolvency); see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming
Fdn., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
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Silicon Valley is through staged financing.113 Japanese VCs use
this staged financing method far less frequently than in the
United States, where it is all but omnipresent for successful early
stage start-ups. 114 From analysis of the table below, two
characteristics of Japanese venture capital investments can be
observed (see TABLE 4).
TABLE 4: Various Methods of Venture Investment

Do you make
syndicated
loans with
other VCs?
Do you make
staged
financing by
setting
milestones?
Are there
systems to
pay
performance
bonuses to
individual
VCs?

1
(negative)

2
(rather
negative)

3
(neutral)

4
(rather
positive)

5
(positive)

22%

7%

12%

39%

20%

23%

19%

14%

29%

14%

52%

3%

4%

12%

29%

1. Reasons for Less Staged Financing in Japan
First, the rate of continuous investments over different
rounds by the same VC is much lower in Japan than in the
United States. 115 Bank-affiliated VCs and securities
113. See, e.g., PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 171
(2d ed. 2004).
114. See Tatsuaki Takahara, Dankaiteki Toshi [Staged Financing], in BENCHA KIGYO
NO HOMU ZAIMU SENRYAKU [LAW AND FINANCE OF VENTURE COMPANIES IN JAPAN],
supra note 26, at 422, 424. The Data in TABLE 4 is from HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 81.
115. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 129; see also KENTA FUNAOKA, SHINKI
KOKAI-JI NO BENCHA KYAPITARU NO YAKUWARI [THE ROLE OF VENTURE CAPITALS AT
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firm-affiliated VCs make one-shot portfolio investments in most
cases, although small numbers of independent venture
capitalists try to take advantage of staged financing when dealing
with their hands-on investments. 116 This typical Japanese
practice gives entrepreneurs little to no incentive to follow the
potentially beneficial directions of a VC.
Second, syndicate financing organized by a lead investor is
not the standard in Japan. Instead, multiple VCs will make
portfolio investments during the same round, with little
cooperation or communication between the different VCs (see
TABLE 4 above). 117 Each VC makes a different investment
contract with the start-up company. This practice gives
entrepreneurs substantial bargaining power in the deal because
they can often make VCs compete against one another. Statistics
show that more venture capitalists in the same round lead to
overall lower internal rate of return (“IRR”) in Japan, which is
opposite the case of the United States.118
2. The Corporate Governance Problems of Venture Capital
Funds
Why do these practices continue in Japan, even where
shown to be hostile to the venture capital industry? Mainly
because of the many corporate governance problems evident
within the venture capital funds themselves. First, most venture
capitalists have no equity incentive.119 As mentioned previously,
many of them are “salary-men,” such as bank and insurance
company employees. Second, most VC fund investors are not
genuinely equity-oriented. They are generally either the VC
companies’ parent financial institutions, or business firms,
which are often their cross-shareholding partner companies.
IPO] 41 (2007). The statistics gathered for this publication show that of the 165 start-up
companies questioned, 119 appear to have only received one round of venture capital
backed financing prior to reaching IPO (data gathered from 2000 to 2005).
116 . Japanese venture capitalists are generally categorized into five groups
depending on their parent companies: bank/insurance company backed venture
capitalists, securities firm backed venture capitalists, business company backed venture
capitalists, government backed venture capitalists, and independent venture capitalists.
See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 51.
117. See id. at 65, 105, 132.
118. See id. at 92.
119. See id. at 65; Shishido, supra note 6, at 197.
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They do not care about the financial return of funds as much as
US Investors to VCs do.120 Moreover, the share of capital being
invested by pension funds’ is still negligible.121 As a result, low
IRR funds can and do survive.122 Third, this type of venture
capitalist has no incentive to follow up with a specific start-up
company or organize a syndicate with other venture capitalists to
increase the size of the round. It is safer for them to make many
portfolio investments to minimize risk and avoid involvement
with potential competitors. And fourth, the small size of VC
funds in Japan reinforces this risk-averse portfolio investment
policy.123
D. Control via Agreement
Even Japanese VCs cannot invest money in start-up
companies without gaining some kind of control. They gain
some informal control by entering into shareholder agreements
peculiar to Japan as well as acquiring some type of observation
rights.
These shareholder agreements consist of two parts. The
first part consists of a preliminary consultation agreement in
which entrepreneurs agree to consult with VCs before the board
decides certain subjects, including business judgment matters in

120. See HASEGAWA, supra note 26, at 75. A 2007 METI study indicates that 60.2%
of Japanese venture capital investments were financial institution-affiliated, while
independent VCs only made up 12.9% of investments; in contrast, independent VCs
made 83.9% of all venture capital investments, while financial institution-affiliated
investments accounted for only 8.8% of total investments made in the United States.
METI, supra note 19, at 61.
121. See HASEGAWA supra note 26, at 57; METI, supra note 19, at 65. Kneller
reports that although private pension funds have been free to invest in ventures since
1999, the percentage of pension assets invested in pre-IPO ventures in Japan is only a
small fraction of pension assets invested in the United States. KNELLER, supra note 47, at
171. According to the Venture Enterprise Center (VEC), pension funds’ share was only
1.5% in fiscal year 2008.
122. The average IRR of Japanese VCs is much lower than that of their US and
European counterparts. See METI, supra note 19, at 63.
123 . Average accumulated investment per fund is US$16.8 million for
government backed VC funds, US$13.1 million for securities firm backed VC funds,
US$13.4 million for insurance company backed VC funds, US$7.9 million for
independent VC funds, US$6.6 million for business company backed VC funds, US$6.2
million for foreign VC funds, and only US$1.8 million for bank backed VC funds. See
Hasegawa, supra note 77, at 64, 72.
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many cases.124 The second part is a stock buy-back agreement, a
promise by the entrepreneurs to buy back the VCs’ stock at cost,
personally in cases of breach of the shareholder agreements,
and, in some cases, if no IPO occurs within a certain time
period. 125 VCs do not necessarily intend to monitor the
entrepreneurs they support, but intend to avoid downside risk,
an act similar to that taken by most Japanese banks.126 The
ubiquity of this contractual practice is one of the reasons why
Japanese venture capitalists are not trusted by entrepreneurs.
CONCLUSION
There seems to be a relentless cycle involved in the
Japanese venture capital market. Although venture capitalists
gain some informal control, they cannot gain enough control to
reduce the risk of venture investments. Therefore, venture
capitalists are unable to invest larger sums of money in a single
start-up. Instead, they are forced to spread their risks by
investing small amounts in many companies, acting more like a
bank.
Entrepreneurs are not willing to forego formal control
because they do not trust venture capitalists and find it difficult
to find third-party references for reassurance. This may simply
be because the venture community in Japan has not yet matured
enough to organize into a Silicon Valley-type reputational
market. Also, entrepreneurs do not have sufficient cash-flow
incentive to cause them to abandon control, partly because the
tax law is prohibitively restrictive when it comes to the use of
sweat equity. This persistent problem limits the overall
124 . Among the subjects of preliminary consultation, there are not only
shareholder’s meeting matters and board meeting matters, but also often include an
annual business plan and an annual budget plan. See Takahara, supra note 78, at 415.
125. See id. According to research by METI, 70% of investment contracts include
such a stock buy-back agreement, while 7% of them were actually executed. See METI,
supra note 19, at 93, 95–96.
126 . Such a practice elucidates the bank-centered capital market influence.
Japanese venture capitalists can trace this practice to similar practices by “main banks.”
Another possible reason for this practice is different tax treatment of the “zombie
corporation.” In the United States, investors can deduct certain investments if the
portfolio company is doubtful as a going concern. Investors have to actually sell the
stock for deductions in Japan. See Miner & Sato, supra note 27, at 129; METI, supra note
19, at 57–58.
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availability of financing for Japanese venture companies, leading
both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to accept a reality
where smaller successes have become the expected norm.
In Silicon Valley, the two-sided agency problem has been
solved by making entrepreneurs cede control to VCs. Why is this
resolution not applicable to Japan? The reasons why Japanese
entrepreneurs refuse to cede control are complementary to one
another.
Black and Gilson’s logic does not explain the Japanese
situation because their proposition requires the existence of a
Berle and Means world where management can maintain
control based on dispersed ownership of the stock, which is
lacking in the Japanese stock market. In Japan, stock ownership
of publicly held corporations has traditionally been stabilized by
bank centered cross shareholding.127 Likewise, Hellmann’s logic
does not explain the Japanese situation because his propositions
require economically reasonable entrepreneurs and sweat equity
as a complement to abandoning control, which do not exist in
Japan.
Although the situation is due in part to the unique culture,
capital market, and reputational market present in Japan, the
legal system clearly plays an important role as well. Japanese
corporate law is based on the shareholder choice doctrine and
stock majority is more important than in the United States. This
results in Japanese entrepreneurs that are very insistent upon
maintaining stock majority of their companies. Board majority is
less important in Japan and directorship entails a sufficiently
high risk of liability to dissuade VCs from taking board positions.
Therefore, the system does not provide a strong enough
incentive to gain board control and so VCs are often averse to it.
Moreover, Japanese tax law is unfriendly to the use of equity as
an incentive. Sharing cash-flow rights cannot be complementary
to sharing control because of the possible gift tax on sweat
equity. The combination of these factors leads Japanese

127 . Recently, banks have unwound their cross-shareholding positions, but
cross-shareholding still remains common among business companies. See generally
Hideaki Miyajima & Fumiaki Kuroki, The Unwinding of Cross-shareholding in Japan:
Causes, Effects, and Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 72 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 2007).
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entrepreneurs to desire
venture-backed start-ups.

to

maintain

control

of

their
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APPENDIX
Double Moral Hazard and the Incentive Bargain
The incentives at play in the venture company context are
ripe for game theoretic analysis. The ultimate objective for the
parties involved in venture capital investments is to try and
maximize their long-term benefits in the face of two types of
risk. One type of risk concerns being excluded from
management and profit, or what can be descriptively called the
“risk of squeeze-out.” The other type of risk concerns the
reliability of the promises to cooperate with each other, or the
“risk of uncooperative behavior.” Within a venture company,
the joint profit of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist is
maximized when both parties cooperate, yet these two types of
risk distort the incentive of each party to cooperate. This sets the
stage upon which the game will be played out; to maximize its
own interest, a party must not only reduce the risk it faces, but
also reduce the risk the other party faces in order to induce
cooperative behavior.
FIGURE 1 (shown below) maps out these incentive effects.
For discussion purposes, imagine a venture company, in which A
(venture capitalist) and B (entrepreneur) are the parties. The
interaction begins by using the mechanisms that increase A’s
incentive to behave cooperatively. The two primary tools are
value sharing and control sharing. Value sharing involves
granting A an equity stake in the venture. The more equity A
has, the more likely A will invest optimally in the joint enterprise
(notice that only at one hundred percent ownership is A’s
incentive perfectly optimal). Control sharing involves giving A
rights within the organization that can be used to limit B’s
actions. One notable example is the use of defensive monitoring
contracts. 128 These can be structured so that A will have
information rights that help A make sure B does not extract
value from the joint project improperly. Similarly, obtaining
board representation or veto rights over certain decisions will
128. These contracts are defensive in that they are protective of A. That is to say,
they grant A certain negative rights that help A prevent harm to herself. In contrast, an
offensive monitoring contract would be an affirmative right granted to A, permitting A
to force B to undertake some action. A paradigmatic example would be granting A the
right to purchase a majority stock position or buy out B.
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give A valuable rights that help make sure it shares in the profits
of the venture at parity with B.
These rights can also be thought of by looking to the risks
they mirror. The risk of squeeze-out distorts the incentive to
cooperate because a party is not incentivized to invest optimally
when the other party can expropriate the fruits of that
investment. At the same time, the risk of squeeze-out by one
party helps monitor the other party’s incentive to cooperate
through a threat of exclusion (illustrated by the arrow from left
to right at the center of FIGURE 1). This occurs because the
other party faces the risk of being squeezed out of the joint
project at a later time if it does not behave cooperatively. In this
way, the risk of squeeze-out monitors the promise to cooperate.
A minority shareholding party always faces a risk of
squeeze-out by the controller. A minority shareholding party
also faces the risk of uncooperative behavior by the controller.
This combination understandably leads to underinvestment by
minority parties.
The majority party that faces no risk of squeeze-out can
decrease his risk of being the victim of uncooperative behavior
by using the threat of exclusion as a penalty, but he cannot
entirely eliminate the risk of uncooperative behavior. As the
controller’s threat of squeezing out an uncooperative minority
becomes more credible, the minority party’s incentive to behave
uncooperatively shrinks. But because the minority party knows
that it may invest in the venture only to be squeezed out later,
the minority party can still be expected to under-invest in the
venture. Thus, the asymmetry affecting this equilibrium is that
when a majority party has an absolute right to squeeze out a
minority, the majority party will have optimal investment
incentives but the minority party will under-invest.
Methods to decrease these risks are limited to activities like
equity sharing, board sharing, monitoring contracts, reputation,
bargaining power, and contingent contracts.129 The interplay of
129. Contingent contracts, accompanied by legal enforcement, can decrease the
risk of uncooperative behavior. The comprehensiveness of contingent contracts
depend on the nature of the transaction. For those conflicts that are predictable,
contingent contracts are an effective solution. However, assuming that the contracts
will be incomplete in some material respect, some issues cannot be resolved through
contingent contracts.

1126 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1087
these devices and the parties’ ability to use them to combat
various risks are responsive to the type of risk involved, as
illustrated in FIGURE 1.
Reputation and bargaining power can work to decrease
both the risk of squeeze-out and the risk of uncooperative
behavior.
If neither party enjoys a sterling reputation nor operates in
an industry where reputation is particularly important, then
neither party can be expected to make significant investments
based upon reliance on the other party’s reputation. How
effectively the reputational mechanism works depends on the
reputational market. A reputational market is an integral
infrastructure of the incentive bargain.
The relative bargaining power of the parties is likely
established by the relative value of the capital they contribute to
the joint project. A party contributing only financial capital will
essentially be forced to rely only on bargained-for contractual
rights and votes attached to equity investments. This is the
reason why venture capitalists invest using staged financing. If
venture capitalists made their investment all at once, they would
lose significant bargaining power against entrepreneurs.
Although in most cases the relative bargaining power of the
parties is apparent, venture capitalists can gain additional
bargaining power through staged financing arrangements, even
without a legal contract.
Therefore, the alternatives that the parties can negotiate ex
ante are equity sharing, board sharing, staged financing, and
monitoring contracts.
FIGURE 1 maps out these relationships.
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FIGURE 1
Factors increasing a
party’s incentive to
cooperate

Value sharing
(granting an equity
stake)

Control sharing
(granting defensive
monitoring contracts)

But increases
risk for other party

Factors decreasing a
party’s incentive to
cooperate

Factors mitigating
these incentive
distortions

Risk of
squeeze out
(at other
party > 50%)

Threat of
exclusion

Relative bargaining power;
offensive monitoring
contracts; reputation;
appraisal rights

Risk of
uncooperative
behavior by
other party

State
contingent
contracts
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